Abstract: Most contractors negotiate with suppliers for their construction procurement according to negotiators' experiences instead of extensive exploration of negotiable options and negotiators' preferences. Consequently, negotiators often reach suboptimal agreements, and leave money on the table. This research developed an agentbased computer system that find optimal agreements using the genetic algorithm, compared the results with the actual contractual agreements, and determine the "money" left on the table in the traditional construction negotiation.
INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is commonly required in the procurement of construction materials to reach the final contractual agreement. For a construction procurement item, a general contractor typically solicits several price quotations from suppliers, considers the suppliers' performance, evaluates those quotations, and narrows down a few prospective suppliers. Subsequent process often involves formal or informal negotiations between the general contractor and the prospective suppliers to finalize the price and other contractual terms (e.g., payment by 30-day check or 60-day check, and payment calculated monthly or at completion).
Nevertheless, a general contractor needs to limit the number of prospective suppliers to negotiate with and the number of negotiation meetings because of the time and man-hours involved. As a result, the negotiation agreement is usually reached depending on experience instead of extensive exploration of negotiable options and preferences of negotiating parties. As concluded by Raiffa [16] , even in simple negotiations, people often reach suboptimal agreements, thereby "leaving money on the table". The challenge of negotiation arises, in part, from the fact that each side has private information about their own utility function but is ignorant of the other's values and strategies. [14] This research developed an agent-based computer system that find optimal agreements using the genetic algorithm, compared the results with the actual contractual agreements, and determine the "money" left on the table in the typical construction negotiation. Negotiators involved in three procurement items (i.e., pre-mixed concrete, rebar, and rebar laborer) of two plant-office complex projects participated the experiments.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Negotiation is a process for resolving conflicts between two or more parties [2] . Ali [1] investigated the factors that suppliers might consider when submitting a bid to a general contractor, including prompt payment habit, reputation for shopping after contract award, experience in building similar projects, efforts in planning and supervision, financial capacity, reputation for finishing projects on time, other work opportunity, and chance to get job of the contractor, past experience with the contractor, clarity of work's specifications, terms of general contract, construction schedule, and construction methods used. Many of these factors (e.g., reputation for shopping after contract award and experience in building similar projects of the contractor), despite being important for preparing the bid proposal, are unlikely to appear as an issue in the negotiation process.
Mumpower [12] found that each negotiating party perceived the negotiable issues differently, and the perception of an issue might be represented by a function of judgment of utility, including weight, function forms, and organization of joint utility structure. Decision-support research has focused on the design and development of tools for aiding negotiators in various domains such as Genie [8] that stresses model visualization capabilities, NEGOPLAN [10] that generates if-then production rules, and GBML [11] that discovers rules for better negotiations.
Software agents are also employed to facilitate negotiation. Software agents are computer programs that exhibit a certain degree of autonomy. They are continuously active and interact with other systems on behalf of the user [4] . Nwana [13] divided agents into collaborative agents, learning agents, interface agents, and smart agents. Brenner [5] Snadholm and Lesser [17] found that cooperative agents often exist and perform tasks inside an enterprise such as production planning and meeting scheduling. A competitive agent will not give in unless it can receive comparable compensation during negotiation because it cares only its own benefit and is least concerned with joint benefit. However, such competitive style prevents disclosure of individual preferences and often results in individual loss of benefit. Many electronic commerce (EC) web sites such as OnSale [15] , eBay's Auction Web [7] , Kasbah [9] , and Auction Bot [3] also offer agents that help on-line negotiation on price. For example, Kasbah adopts the distribution type of negotiation and allows users to define their own agents with buying strategies (i.e., anxious, cool-head and frugal), selling strategies (i.e., anxious, cool-head and greedy), and initialization parameters (e.g., asking price, acceptable price, and deadline). T@T [18] , in addition to price, allows both buyer and sellers to customize their agents and negotiate on warranty, delivery time and method, service plan, return policy, and free bonus. No agents have been developed to specifically help negotiation of construction procurement between contractor and suppliers.
This research chooses the agent-based approach, and assumes an integration type of negotiation; i.e., enlarging the pie of available resources. Each agent has its own preferences and negotiates with each other through collaboration. However, to be realistic, a negotiating agent is not aware of the preferences of the other, and is communicating through an intermediate coordinator agent.
NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT POINTS
In practice, issues to be negotiated are determined at the beginning of negotiations, but new issues sometimes may arise during negotiations. The contractor proposes desired options for the negotiable issues, and the supplier proposes a price according to these options. The proposed price may be continuously lowered during the negotiations. The supplier may also request to modify terms or to include new issues to offset price decreases. The negotiation ends when both parties agree on the options and price. These issues may be classified into four categories according to the range of options available. The first category is price, for which options lie on a continuous spectrum.
The second category includes issues for which a limited number of commonly used options exist. For example, options for payment terms include: "cash", "30-day check", "45-day check", and "60-day check"; for payment period options include "on delivery", "on completion of milestones", "on completion", "monthly", and "bi-weekly"; for advance payment options include "10%", "15%", "20%", "25%", and "30%"; for freightage options include "included" and "excluded", for delivery options include "single delivery", "multiple deliveries", and "on-call delivery".
The third category includes issues whose options are a list of items and quantities. For example, options for resource provision are a list of provided resources and quantities, and options for extended procurement opportunities are a list of additional procured items and their quantities.
The fourth category includes issues for which options are quantity related. For example, options for mass procurement opportunity are the maximum quantities procurable; and options for future procurement opportunity are possible future procurement quantities. The implied procured item for these issues is the item being negotiated on.
Among the issues identified, only the first and second categories are considered negotiable in this study. Issues of the third and fourth categories are not considered because they mainly arise in a negotiation out of capacity leeway of a contractor and are wholly determined by the contractor. For example, a contractor only offers an opportunity for extended procurement to a supplier when there is still extended procurement that has not been tendered. It is uncommon for a supplier to make a contractor to squeeze out new procurement during the negotiation. As a result, these issues are treated as non-negotiable issues and are determined solely by a contractor.
The non-negotiable issues, although cannot be counter-offered by a supplier, may affect a supplier's quoted price. Because these issues involve uncertainty, they are represented by estimated expected monetary values in this research.
OPTIMAL NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT
U (x): total payoff of a negotiator for the chosen set of options x; U i (x i ): issue payoff of a negotiator for the chosen option x i for issue i; W i : weight of issue i for calculating negotiator payoff.
According to this concept, simplified, generalized contractor and supplier payoff functions used in this study are discussed below for the aforementioned two categories of negotiable issues.
Negotiator payoff may positively correlates with issue options. For example, the contractor generally prefers longer payment term, in order to delay the payment as long as possible, and thus contractor's payoff for "60-day check" is greater than that of "cash". Negotiators may also feel indifferent to some intermediate options. For example, some contractors may be indifferent to a payment term of "30-day check" or "45-day check". Similarly, a negotiator's payoff may also negatively correlate with issue options. For example, a supplier may prefer shorter payment term, and thus may have a smaller payoff for "60-day check" than for "cash". Of course, some suppliers may also feel indifferent to the length of payment term.
System Description
The system comprises three agents, namely Contractor, Supplier, and Coordinator. The human contractor must initiate the agent with a set of negotiation criteria (i.e., negotiable issues and their allowable options, weights and payoff functions) and GA settings (i.e., population size n, crossover rate c, mutation rate m, and threshold for fitness improvement factor g). Information on the negotiation criteria and GA settings is passed to Coordinator, but not to Supplier, except for the negotiable issues and allowable options, which are passed further to Supplier. The human supplier must respond to this message by determining acceptable options, weight, and payoff function for each negotiable issue.
Contractor and Supplier have similar objectives; i.e., to generate an offer that is acceptable to its own criteria and has payoff higher than the offer proposed by the counter part through a continuously random selection process, and evolve the offer to find the best one through GA. Take Contractor as an example, the first step is to generate n offers as its population. Each offer includes an option for each negotiable issue and a threshold T, which equals the corresponding payoff of the option according to the payoff function of the contractor. The threshold represents the satisfaction level of the contractor with the offer. The second step involves randomly selecting an offer from the population and submitting it to Coordinator, who at this time also receives an offer from Supplier. If the offer of Contractor provides Supplier with a payoff higher than that from the Supplier offer, and Supplier offer provides Contractor a payoff higher than the payoff of the Contractor offer, both offers are saved in their respective tentative pools. Otherwise, Coordinator passes the offer back to Contractor and Supplier and asks them to select another offer. This process continues until Coordinator has n Contractor offers and n Supplier offers. The total of 2n offers are used to calculate the fitness evolution improvement factor g. If g is smaller than the pre-determined threshold, the search has reached a convergence, and Coordinator presents the offer with the highest sum of payoff of both contractor and supplier as the final result. Otherwise, Coordinator requests both Contractor and Supplier to generate another generation of offer populations. Through generations of evolution, when g is below the threshold, most offers in the population already have fitness scores approaching the best offer. Thus, further evolution achieves insignificant improvement, and so evolution can stop.
EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY
This study conducted experiments to find the payoff left on the table of construction negotiating parties. Three procurement items, namely pre-mixed concrete, rebar, and rebar assembly, of two projects A and B were selected for the experiments. Both projects involved an office-plant complex. Project A is a $US 7.77 millions project that has five stories plus one underground story, while Project B is a $US 22.79 millions project that has five stories plus two underground stories. The negotiators originally involved in the contracts were invited to assign the utility weights for the relevant negotiable issues and options in C-Negotiator. The negotiators included the section manager of the participating contractor, and the owner, president or vice president of the subcontractors, with from 9 to 21 years of procurement experience.
The actual contractual agreement was taken as the outcome of human negotiations while the agreement suggested by the C-Negotiators was assumed to be theoretically optimal outcome. Because human negotiators may not accept the best agreement suggested by C-Negotiators, the following best agreement that was acceptable to human negotiators was the actual optimal outcome.
The parameter values used for GA were based on the suggestions proposed by DeJong, and included population size = 50, crossover rate = 0.7, and mutation rate = 0.02. The threshold for the fitness improvement factor was set to 5%. A virtual project was also used to help participants familiarize themselves with the system before the experiments began. Table 1 compares the negotiation outcomes of contractual agreement (i.e., human negotiation), theoretical optimal agreement (i.e., the best agreement found by C-Negotiators), and the practical optimal (i.e., the agreement chosen by negotiators from the best 10 agreements found by C-Negotiators) for three suppliers, PMC (pre-mixed concrete), REB (re-bar), and RLB (re-bar labor) of both projects. Each set of outcomes includes a joint payoff as well as contractor's and supplier's individual payoffs. C-negotiators always reached an agreement with higher joint payoff (from 1.1% more to 9.8% more) than human-based negotiation. This difference occurred because the human negotiators tried to reach a mutually acceptable agreement according to experience, while the agents tried to maximize the joint payoff through extensive search. Thus, agents are more motivated in finding the best agreement.
EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The improvement in joint payoff was smaller than expected. This phenomenon occurred because the number of negotiable issues and options were limited, and human negotiators could reach good agreement depending on years of experience. Nevertheless, the experiments also demonstrated that C-Negotiator occasionally might help negotiators "leave less money on the table", achieving improvements of as much as 9.8% of payoff, as in the negotiation with rebar supplier for Project B (Table 1) .
Agent-based negotiation does not always reach an agreement with higher contractor payoff or supplier payoff than human-based negotiation. While agentbased negotiation attempts to find the agreement with the highest joint payoff, it may also indirectly redistribute the payoff between contractor and supplier. Therefore, one may not accept the agentsuggested best agreement if his/her payoff is lower than the payoff of human-based negotiation. The remedy to this problem presented here was to choose the agent-suggested 10 best offers, and present only those offers with individual payoffs equal to or higher than those of human-based negotiation. Negotiators found acceptable agreements from the presented ones in most cases. When none of the presented agreements was acceptable, the negotiators might adjust some terms to reflect their concerns. Discussion Figures 1-3 compares the improvement of joint payoff, contractor's payoff, and supplier's payoff of C-Negotiators' suggested best agreement (theoretical best) and the agreement actually chosen by negotiators (actual best). In the Y-axis, the first letter represents the project (e.g., A-for Project A) and the following three letters represent the contract (e.g., RLB for rebar labor). Figure 1 shows that the theoretical best improves the joint payoff by approximately from 1% to 10%. However, negotiators may not always agree to those values, as shown by B-RLB, B-PMC, and A-PMC. 3 show that, when C-Negotiators was improving the joint payoffs, the improvement on both contractor's and supplier's payoffs was not guaranteed. This also resulted in greater difference in the payoff improvements of actual best and theoretical agreements, as shown by B-RLB, B-PMC, A-RLB, and A-PMC in Figures 2 and 3 . In other words, when C-Negotiators suggest the best agreement, negotiators will accept only if the agreement results in better or equal payoff than the contractual agreement, and the proportion of contractor's and supplier's payoff in the joint payoff did not considerably deviate from that of the contractual agreement. However, unlike we have hindsight in these experiments regarding the contractual agreements, in actual negotiation, no one knows the contractual agreement at the time of negotiation. Therefore, even though C-Negotiator's algorithm can be adapted to keep the proportion to accommodate the bargaining power issue, appropriate proportion is hard to determine. Past contracts may be a clue to discovering such a proportion. The future direction of this research will focus on addressing this problem.
